U.S. Constitution · Article II, Section 1, Clause 1

Executive Vesting Clause

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Also known as: Executive Vesting Clause

Live in the VFA record

Cited in 8 SI Solutions and 10 grades this month.

30 public items cite this provision · 18 in October 2026 (last month: 0)

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Citations per week, last 12 weeks

The text

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

National Archives transcription (public domain; original spelling and capitalization). archives.gov

SI explainer

An explainer for this provision is in the queue. It appears here once it passes the SI Editorial Standard’s automated checks. The text, founding-era sources and live citations below are complete.

In the founders’ words

  • “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” James Madison, The Federalist No. 47 (1788-02-01)
  • “But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.” James Madison, The Federalist No. 51 (1788-02-08)
  • “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 70 (1788-03-18)
  • “The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 70 (1788-03-18)
  • “Mr. RANDOLPH strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man.” James Madison, Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, June 1, 1787 (1787-06-01)
  • “Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.” James Madison, Madison's Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention, June 1, 1787 (1787-06-01)
  • “It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that in all magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration; and that a longer time than a year, would be dangerous.” Cato (attributed to George Clinton), Cato, No. 4 (1787-11-08)
  • “Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates, I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 72 (1788-03-21)

Public-domain primary sources, quoted word for word and checked against the linked text.

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SI Solutions (19)

grades (10)

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Cite this page

Values for America Constitution Explorer, https://www.valuesforamerica.com/constitution (text: National Archives transcription, public domain), Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, https://www.valuesforamerica.com/constitution/article-2/section-1/clause-1

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