U.S. Constitution · Article III, Section 1

Judicial Power, Courts, and Judges

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Also known as: Judicial Vesting Clause · Good Behaviour Clause · Judicial Compensation Clause

Live in the VFA record

Cited in 1 VFA SI Solution and 7 grades this month.

22 public items cite this provision · 8 in October 2026 (last month: 1)

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Citations per week, last 12 weeks

The text

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

National Archives transcription (public domain; original spelling and capitalization). archives.gov

SI explainer

An explainer for this provision is in the queue. It appears here once it passes the SI Editorial Standard’s automated checks. The text, founding-era sources and live citations below are complete.

In the founders’ words

  • “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” James Madison, The Federalist No. 47 (1788-02-01)
  • “Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788-05-28)
  • “The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788-05-28)
  • “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred;” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78 (1788-05-28)
  • “There is no power above them, to controul any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.” Brutus (attributed to Robert Yates), Brutus, No. 15 (1788-03-20)
  • “They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and salaries. No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be removed from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudications.” Brutus (attributed to Robert Yates), Brutus, No. 11 (1788-01-31)
  • “The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal.” Brutus (attributed to Robert Yates), Brutus, No. 11 (1788-01-31)
  • “In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 81 (1788-05-28)
  • “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.” James Madison, James Madison, Speech Proposing Amendments, House of Representatives, June 8, 1789 (Annals of Congress 1:448-60) (1789-06-08)

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Cite this page

Values for America Constitution Explorer, https://www.valuesforamerica.com/constitution (text: National Archives transcription, public domain), Article III, Section 1, https://www.valuesforamerica.com/constitution/article-3/section-1

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