Re-decided holding: The FAA §1 exemption covers workers on intrastate legs of interstate journeys, consistent with the original meaning of 'engaged in interstate commerce.'

1) The question: Does a worker who transports goods only within one state, as part of a continuous interstate journey, qualify for the §1 exemption from compelled arbitration? 2) Relevant constitutional text: Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 gives Congress power to regulate 'Commerce . . . among the several States.' The FAA, enacted under this power, exempts workers 'engaged in . . . interstate commerce.' 3) Ratification-era understanding: At the Founding, 'commerce among the States' meant trade and transportation that crossed state lines, but by 1925 (when the FAA was enacted), the ordinary meaning of 'interstate commerce' included the continuous carriage of goods between states, even if some legs were intrastate. Dictionaries from 1925 define 'interstate commerce' as 'traffic or transportation between points in one state and points in another state,' which necessarily includes intrastate segments of a through journey. 4) Holding: Angelo Brock, who picks up Flowers Foods' products from a Colorado warehouse and delivers them to local stores as part of an interstate distribution chain, is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of §1. He need not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do. 5) Downstream changes: Lower courts must apply this rule, overruling any precedent that required a bright-line state-line crossing. The FAA's exemption now clearly protects workers on the last mile of interstate delivery, ensuring they retain access to courts unless they explicitly waive that right.