A prisoner may raise a credible claim of actual innocence in a compassionate release motion under §3582(c)(1)(A), but only if the claim is supported by new evidence not previously available and the prisoner shows diligence.

The question is whether 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A) permits a federal prisoner to argue that his conviction is invalid as an 'extraordinary and compelling reason' for early release. The relevant constitutional text is the Suspension Clause (Article I, §9, cl. 2): 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.' The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause also protects against imprisonment without lawful cause. At the ratification, the writ of habeas corpus was understood to reach any unlawful detention, including detention based on a wrongful conviction. The First Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1789, which allowed prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement. The compassionate release statute, §3582, was enacted in 1984 as part of the Sentencing Reform Act. Its text says 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' without defining the term. The Sentencing Commission's policy statement (U.S.S.G. §1B1.13) lists examples but does not exclude innocence claims. The majority's holding that §2255 is the exclusive vehicle for innocence claims conflicts with the Suspension Clause because §2255 has a one-year statute of limitations and a bar on successive petitions. If a prisoner discovers new evidence of innocence after the §2255 deadline, and that evidence is credible, the Suspension Clause requires that some remedy be available. The compassionate release motion is a proper vehicle because it is not a collateral attack on the conviction—it is a request for mercy based on changed circumstances. The prisoner is not asking to vacate the conviction; he is asking for a sentence reduction because continued imprisonment would be unjust. The holding: A prisoner may raise a credible claim of actual innocence in a motion under §3582(c)(1)(A) if (1) the claim is based on new evidence that was not available at the time of trial or direct appeal, (2) the prisoner exercised reasonable diligence in discovering and presenting the evidence, and (3) the evidence would likely establish that no reasonable juror would have convicted. The district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if the prisoner makes a prima facie showing. If the court finds the claim credible, it may reduce the sentence, but it cannot vacate the conviction—that remedy remains under §2255. This holding respects the text of §3582, which does not exclude innocence claims, and satisfies the Suspension Clause by providing a safety valve for actual innocence. It does not open the floodgates because the standard is high: new evidence, diligence, and a likelihood of acquittal. It also harmonizes §3582 with §2255: §2255 remains the primary vehicle for collateral attacks, but §3582 provides a limited backstop for cases of manifest injustice. Downstream effects: The Second Circuit's judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for the district court to consider whether Fernandez's claim meets the standard. Other circuits that have barred innocence claims in §3582 motions must reconsider.