The Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize automatic extension of supervised release for abscondment; only Congress may provide such a remedy.

1) The question is whether a federal court may automatically extend a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds (fails to report or disappears) before the term expires. 2) The relevant constitutional text is Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 (Congress's power to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces') and the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18), which together grant Congress the power to define federal crimes and punishments. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that any deprivation of liberty (including extended supervision) be imposed only through lawfully enacted procedures. 3) At ratification, the understanding was that criminal punishments must be fixed by statute, not by judicial discretion beyond statutory limits. Federalist No. 47 (Madison) warns against the accumulation of legislative and judicial powers. The original meaning of the separation of powers prohibits courts from adding penalties not authorized by Congress. 4) The holding: The Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize automatic extension of supervised release for abscondment. The statute provides specific mechanisms for violations (revocation, extension after hearing, tolling during imprisonment) but does not include an automatic extension rule. The Ninth Circuit's rule is invalid because it exceeds the statutory framework and violates the separation of powers. 5) Downstream: Courts must follow the existing statutory procedures: if a defendant absconds, the probation officer must seek a warrant or summons during the term (18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)). If the warrant is issued during the term, revocation proceedings may occur after expiration for violations that occurred before expiration. If no warrant is issued, the term expires and cannot be extended. Congress may amend the statute to add an automatic extension rule, but courts cannot.