Re-decided holding: The state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on attenuation violates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause as understood at ratification, and habeas relief was properly granted.

1) The question is whether a state may, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, deny a defendant the ability to have a jury determine whether a post-warning confession (given after police first obtained an involuntary confession without Miranda warnings) was sufficiently attenuated to be voluntary. 2) The relevant constitutional text is: 'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law' (Fifth Amendment). This clause, as originally understood, prohibits the government from using any compelled self-incriminatory statement — directly or derivatively — at trial. 3) At ratification, 'witness against himself' meant that a person could not be forced to give testimony that could lead to conviction. The Founders understood that a coerced confession was inherently unreliable and an affront to personal autonomy; they would have viewed a subsequent confession obtained by the same overall interrogation process as presumptively tainted unless the government proved a break in the causal chain. The jury, as the trier of all factual issues bearing on guilt, was the proper body to decide attenuation because the truth or falsity of a confession is a factual matter. 4) Holding: The Fifth Amendment requires that, where a defendant presents evidence that an initial confession was involuntary due to coercion or lack of Miranda warnings, the jury must be instructed that it may disregard any subsequent confession unless the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the taint was cured — e.g., through a break in custody, a fresh set of warnings, and a knowing and voluntary waiver. The state trial court here violated that requirement by telling the jury simply 'no' to a question that directly implicated federal constitutional rights. 5) What changes downstream: Under AEDPA, the state court's decision was 'contrary to' clearly established federal law because it applied a state procedural rule (no jury instruction on attenuation) that conflicted with the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. Therefore, the Second Circuit correctly granted habeas relief. State courts must now instruct juries on attenuation when the defendant raises a colorable claim that a pre-warning confession was involuntary.