RLUIPA permits suits against state entities and officials in their official capacities, but not against state employees in their personal capacities, unless they individually consented.

1) The constitutional question is whether RLUIPA, as a Spending Clause statute, can impose personal liability on state prison officers who did not personally consent to suit. 2) Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 grants Congress the power to spend for the general welfare and to attach conditions to federal funds. The Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) allows Congress to enact laws that are appropriate to ensure compliance. The First Amendment (Free Exercise) and Tenth Amendment place outer bounds, but do not bar Congress from conditioning funds on states providing remedies for religious burdens. 3) At ratification, the Spending Clause was understood to give Congress broad discretion to set conditions, and the Tenth Amendment reserved to states those powers not delegated—but accepting conditions is a voluntary choice of the state. State employees, as agents of the state, are bound by state law implementing the condition; they need not personally consent to federal suit because the state's consent is imputed to them in their official capacities. However, personal-capacity liability imposes an individual obligation that the employee did not agree to, and no constitutional text or original understanding supports forcing such liability without personal consent. 4) The holding: RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for damages against state officers in their personal capacities, because they have not voluntarily and knowingly consented to be sued. But RLUIPA does permit suits against the state entity (here LDOC) and against officers in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief, and for damages if the state has waived sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. 5) Downstream, this means inmates may still sue the state prison system for injunctions and, where the state has accepted funds, for damages against the state (subject to any explicit waiver). Individual officers are not personally liable, but the state remains accountable for its employees' actions, preserving the incentives to comply with RLUIPA.