Re-decided: A lawful permanent resident may be deemed 'seeking admission' only upon conviction (or clear and convincing evidence of commission) of a qualifying crime at the time of reentry.

1. The question presented is whether the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows a border officer to treat a lawful permanent resident as an applicant for admission—and thus removable on inadmissibility grounds—based solely on a pending criminal charge, without requiring clear and convincing evidence that the resident actually committed the alleged crime. 2. The relevant constitutional text provides: (a) the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) grants Congress power to make laws for executing its enumerated powers, including naturalization (Clause 4); (b) the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law; (c) the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the United States. The INA does not explicitly authorize border officers to unilaterally reclassify permanent residents as inadmissible based on unproven allegations—such a power is not necessary and proper to execute the naturalization power, because conviction or clear evidence of commission is a reasonable, liberty-protecting requirement. 3. At the ratification era, the founding generation understood that banishment or expulsion after lawful entry required a judicial determination of guilt or at least clear proof of wrongdoing. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government from depriving persons of their life, liberty, or property without a fair procedure. Lawful permanent residents, though not citizens, enjoy significant liberty interests under the common law and the Bill of Rights. Blackstone and early American authorities recognized that aliens lawfully within the country could not be removed without a judicial process and proof of their misdeeds. The original meaning of 'due process' thus requires that before a permanent resident is stripped of his admitted status and subjected to removal on inadmissibility grounds, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has committed the qualifying crime. 4. The holding: The INA's phrase 'has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2)' (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v)) means that a lawful permanent resident may be regarded as seeking admission only if the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the resident actually committed such an offense. This standard is satisfied by a conviction, but not by a mere charge or arrest. The government bears the burden to present this evidence at the removal hearing—not at the border, where quick judgments are permissible for temporary parole, but the final determination of inadmissibility must rest on clear and convincing proof. 5. What changes downstream: (a) The Second Circuit's judgment is affirmed as modified: the removal order is vacated, and the government may reinstitute removal proceedings only if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that Lau committed a crime involving moral turpitude at the time of his reentry. A guilty plea admits the commission, so the government can likely meet this burden. (b) The rule announced applies only to permanent residents who were previously admitted and have a due process liberty interest; arriving aliens not yet admitted have no such protection. (c) The government must re-prove the commission element on remand using clear and convincing evidence; Lau's conviction is admissible but the government must also show it relates to conduct that occurred before the reentry.