Rooker-Feldman applies only to final judgments from the highest state court in which review could be had, consistent with 28 U.S.C. §1257.

1) The question is whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over a case brought by a state-court loser when the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. 2) The relevant constitutional text is Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 'both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.' Congress has exercised this power in 28 U.S.C. §1257(a), which limits Supreme Court review to '[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.' 3) At ratification, the Framers understood that lower federal courts would have original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, as provided in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, and the Judiciary Act of 1789. They did not intend for federal district courts to sit as appellate courts over state courts, but neither did they intend to bar district court jurisdiction over cases involving non-final state judgments, which were not within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as originally formulated in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman (1983), was limited to final judgments from the highest state court, consistent with §1257. 4) The holding is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction only over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments that are final and from the highest state court in which a decision could be had, as defined by 28 U.S.C. §1257. Non-final judgments or judgments still subject to state appellate review are not within the doctrine's scope, and district courts may exercise their original jurisdiction over such cases, subject to abstention and preclusion doctrines as appropriate. 5) Downstream, this means that T. M.'s federal suit may proceed in district court because the consent order was not a final judgment from the highest state court; the state appeal was pending. The district court must consider whether abstention under Younger v. Harris or preclusion principles apply, but it cannot dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.