Re-decided holding: A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver in a plea agreement is enforceable according to its terms, subject only to the two explicit exceptions in the waiver itself (ineffective assistance of counsel and sentence exceeding statutory maximum).

The constitutional question here is whether Article III courts may enforce a criminal defendant's appeal waiver that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, when that waiver was part of a plea agreement that the district court accepted. The relevant constitutional text is the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which requires that waivers of rights be knowing and voluntary, and Article III, which vests judicial power in federal courts. Ratification-era understanding confirms that parties to a contract—including plea agreements—are bound by their terms if those terms are entered into freely. The plea agreement here was knowing and voluntary, as the district court found after colloquy. The waiver expressly allowed appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel and sentences above the statutory maximum. The medication condition does not exceed the statutory maximum, and Hunted did not raise ineffective assistance. Therefore, the holding is that the appeal waiver is enforceable, and Hunter's appeal must be dismissed. The district court's misstatement about appeal rights does not alter the written agreement, which required any modification to be in writing and signed by both parties. The government's silence at sentencing does not constitute waiver of its right to enforce the waiver, as the proper time to assert that right is after a notice of appeal is filed. What changes downstream: Courts of appeals must enforce appeal waivers as written, unless the defendant demonstrates that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The 'miscarriage of justice' exception is abolished as lacking constitutional basis.