To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose an excise tax on certain institutions of higher education that allow male participation in female intercollegiate athletic programs or events.

The power to lay and collect taxes is enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, and is among the most essential prerogatives of the federal government. An excise tax on institutions of higher education that permit male participation in female athletic programs is a permissible exercise of this power, as it is an indirect tax and need not be apportioned under Article I, Section 9, Clause 4. It is uniform in its application, operating on all such institutions equally. The tax does not command the states to act, but rather imposes a burden on private entities that choose to engage in the desc…

This bill exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress under the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States, or to the people, powers not delegated to the United States. Education and athletic programs are matters of state and local concern, not federal. Furthermore, the First Amendment protects the freedom of association and expression of institutions, which includes determining their own athletic policies. The proposed excise tax is a penalty disguised as a tax, aimed at coercing conduct not within federal authority, violating the spirit of strict construction of federal power.

The power of Congress to lay and collect taxes is extensive, yet it is a power to provide revenue for the general welfare, not a power to regulate matters reserved to the States. This excise tax, aimed at institutions of higher education for policies regarding athletic participation, may be a constitutional exercise of the taxing power if it is a bona fide revenue measure. However, should it operate as a penalty designed to coerce a particular policy in an area traditionally under State jurisdiction, it would offend the principle of federalism and the enumeration of powers. The effect on insti…

The Congress possesses the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to provide for the general welfare. The excise tax here is a regulation of the conduct of institutions of higher learning, and the means chosen—a tax upon those who permit male participation in female athletic programs—is plainly adapted to the legitimate end of preserving the integrity of athletic competitions. As this Court held in McCulloch v. Maryland, let the end be legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, are const…