Nonretroactive sentencing amendments may constitute an 'extraordinary and compelling reason' under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) when the resulting disparity is extreme, unjustified, and not based solely on congressional intent to deny relief.

This case asks whether a sentencing disparity created when Congress reduces a penalty but declines to make that reduction retroactive can be an 'extraordinary and compelling reason' warranting compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Relevant constitutional text: Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (spending power and general welfare); Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 (courts); Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 (pardons); First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i); 28 U.S.C. §994(t). Ratification-era understanding: Congress's authority over federal crimes and punishments is plenary but must be exercised within enumerated powers. The compassionate release statute reflects Congress's delegation to courts to reduce sentences for 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' without further defining that term, save for excluding rehabilitation alone. The Sentencing Commission was created to provide policy guidance, consistent with Article I's delegation of sentencing matters to the legislative branch. The Constitution does not require that sentencing disparities from nonretroactive amendments be ignored; rather, Article II's pardon power and Article III's judicial power allow for individualized mercy and equitable relief where a sentence is grossly disproportionate. Holding: When Congress reduces a penalty but does not make the change retroactive, the resulting sentencing disparity is not categorically excluded from consideration as an 'extraordinary and compelling reason.' A district court may treat a severe disparity—especially one that results in a sentence drastically longer than the current penalty for the same conduct—as one factor, combined with other circumstances, to warrant a sentence reduction. The statute does not say 'unless Congress deliberately denied retroactivity.' The Sentencing Commission's policy statement (USSG §1B1.13, Amendment 814) listing 'unusually long sentence' as an extraordinary and compelling reason is consistent with 28 U.S.C. §994(t) and deserves deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Courts must, however, weigh the §3553(a) factors and respect Congress's judgment that some lines must be drawn. A finding that a disparity is 'extraordinary and compelling' requires more than a mere difference in law; it requires that the disparity be egregious (e.g., decades longer than current penalties) and that the prisoner's individual circumstances merit relief. What changes downstream: (1) District courts may now consider nonretroactive sentencing changes as part of a compassionate release analysis, but they must not treat the disparity as dispositive. (2) The Third Circuit's categorical bar is reversed; remand for re-evaluation under this standard. (3) The Sentencing Commission's policy statement on 'unusually long sentence' is valid and should guide courts.